Dynamic loading of software components is a commonly used mechanism to achieve better flexibility and modularity in software. For an application's runtime safety, it is important for the application to load only its intended components. However, programming mistakes may lead to failures to load a component, or even worse, to load a malicious component. Recent work has shown that these errors are both prevalent and severe, sometimes leading to remote code execution attacks. The work is based on dynamic analysis by monitoring and analyzing runtime component loadings. Although simple and effective in detecting real errors, it suffers from limited code coverage and may miss important vulnerabilities. Thus, it is desirable to develop effective techniques to detect all possible unsafe component loadings. This paper presents the first static binary analysis aiming at detecting all possible loading-related errors. The key challenge is how to scalably and precisely compute what components may be loaded at relevant program locations. Our main insight is that this information is often determined locally from the component loading call sites. This motivates us to design a demand-driven analysis, working backward starting from the relevant call sites. In particular, for a given call site c, we first compute its context-sensitive executable slices, one for each execution context. Then we emulate the slices to obtain the set of components possibly loaded at c. This novel combination of slicing and emulation achieves good scalability and precision by avoiding expensive symbolic analysis. We implemented our technique and evaluated its effectiveness against the existing dynamic technique on nine popular Windows applications. Results show that our tool has better coverage and is precise-it is able to detect many more unsafe loadings. It is also scalable and able to analyze all nine applications within minutes.
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic component loading is widely used in software development to build flexible and modular software. Operating systems (OSes) typically provide relevant system calls, such as dlopen, to load dynamic components. Once a loading system call is invoked, the underlying OS resolves and loads the specified comPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Copyright 20XX ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$10.00. ponent. Component resolution depends on how the component is specified-either through the intended component's full path or its file name. Given a full path, the OS simply uses it for resolution. Given only a file name, the OS searches over a sequence of directories to locate a file with the specified name. Which sequence of directories to search is controlled at runtime by the particular directory search order at the time of system call invocation.
The flexibility of this common style of component loading does come with a price-it introduces an inherent security concern. For runtime safety and security, an application should only load its intended components. However, as the OS resolves a component only through its name, programming mistakes can lead to the loading of an unintended component with the same name.
Recent work [12] has shown that unsafe loadings are prevalent and can lead to remote code execution attacks. A dynamic technique was proposed to detect unsafe component loadings. In particular, it collects at runtime loading-related information-such as the target component to be loaded, the directory search order, and the actually loaded component-at each of the invocation sites for the loading system call. It then performs an offline analysis to detect two types of unsafe loadings: resolution failure and resolution hijacking. A resolution failure happens when the target component is not found, while a resolution hijacking happens when other directories are searched before the directory where the loaded component resides. Besides crashing an application, unsafe loadings also make the application vulnerable to component hijacking.
For example, on Microsoft Windows, Acrobat Reader loads the spool driver in the System directory by invoking the system call LoadLibrary("WINSPOOL.DRV"). Although this loading succeeds, it is unsafe because component hijacking is possible. The OS resolves the component by searching through a sequence of directories specified by the directory search order to find a file with the name "WINSPOOL.DRV". According to Microsoft [7] , the OS checks the directory where Acrobat Reader is installed before the System directory. Thus, the loading of the spool driver can be hijacked by placing an arbitrary file named "WINSPOOL.DRV" in the Acrobat Reader directory. This vulnerability can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code when Acrobat Reader runs.
Although the proposed dynamic technique [12] is effective at detecting real unsafe loadings, it may miss errors because of limited code coverage, an inherent weakness of dynamic analysis. We illustrate this issue using delayed loading, an optimization to postpone the loading of infrequently used components until their first use. Delayed loading is challenging for dynamic detection because it is difficult to trigger all delayed loadings at runtime. Figure 1 shows a code snippet that uses delayed loading in Microsoft Windows. The code shows two functions f1 and f2 that use components registered for delayed loading. In particular, f1 and f2 retrieve the addresses of OpenPrinter exported by WINSPOOL.DRV and GetSaveFile exported by COMDLG32.DLL respectively. Although the example only shows two functions f1 and f2, in practice, there are often many more. The infrequent use of the components makes it difficult, if not impossible, to trigger all possible loadings at runtime. Although we have illustrated the problem using delayed loading, poor coverage of dynamic analysis is a general concern for detecting unsafe loadings, as our results also confirm (cf. Section 4).
In this paper, we present the first static analysis to detect unsafe loadings from program binaries. Two pieces of essential information are needed: 1) all components that may be loaded at each loading call site, and 2) the safety of each possible loading. While the second part is straightforward, the key challenge lies in the first part-how to precisely and scalably compute the possible loadings. Our key observation is: for a given invocation of the loading system call, the set of possible loaded components is determined by the system call's parameter values, which are often determined through computations that originate not far from the call site. From these observations, we design a two-phase analysis: extraction and checking. The extraction phase is demand-driven, working backward from each loading call site to compute the set of possible loadings; the checking phase determines the safety of a loading by examining the relevant directory search order at the call site.
Context-Sensitive Emulation. To realize the backward computation of parameter values during the extraction phase, we introduce context-sensitive emulation, a novel combination of slicing and emulation. For a given call site, we extract its context-sensitive executable slices w.r.t. its parameters, one for each execution context. We then emulate the slices to compute the parameter values.
Incremental and Modular Slicing. One technical obstacle is how to compute backward slices scalably. Standard slicing techniques [1, 5, 9, 16, 20, 21] are based on computing a program's complete system dependence graph (SDG) a priori and are thus limited in scalability. Because we only need to consider loading call sites and the execution paths to compute the parameter values to the calls are usually relatively short, only a small fraction of the complete SDG is relevant for our analysis. This motivates the use of an incremental and modular slicing algorithm (cf. Section 3)-incremental because we build the slices lazily when necessary; modular because when we encounter a function call foo(x,y), we use an inferred summary of what dependencies foo's parameters and return value have in analyzing the caller. At the end, we connect the function-level slices in the standard way by linking formal and actual parameters.
Emulation of Context-sensitive Slices. Once we have computed the backward slice s w.r.t. a given loading call site, we need to compute possible values for the relevant parameters. One natural solution is to perform standard symbolic analysis on the slice to compute the values. The main challenge for this approach is the difficulty in reasoning symbolically about system calls because the relevant parameters often depend on complex, low-level system calls. For example, many Windows applications invoke the system call GetSystemDirectory to retrieve the full path of a system component. To overcome this difficulty, we use emulation. In particular, we generate, from the backward slice s, a set of context-sensitive executable sub-slices, which we then emulate to compute the parameter values (cf. Section 3). Essentially, we inline callees' function-level slices in each execution context to produce s's sub-slices s1, . . . , sn. Instructions in each sub-slice si are next emulated topologically, respecting their data-and control-flow dependencies.
For evaluation, we implemented our technique in a prototype tool for Windows applications. We evaluated our tool's effectiveness against the previous dynamic tool [12] in terms of precision, scalability, and coverage. Results on nine popular applications show that our tool is precise and scalable (cf. Section 4). For example, it took less than two minutes to analyze each of the nine test subjects, including large applications such as Acrobat Reader, Quicktime, and Safari. The results also show that our proposed context-sensitive emulation achieves orders of magnitude reduction in the size of the code needed to be analyzed and crucially contributes to the scalability of our technique. In terms of coverage, our tool detected many more possible unsafe loadings and nicely complements the dynamic technique.
Main Contributions:
• We have developed the first static binary analysis to detect unsafe component loadings. Because of its scalability and higher code coverage, our technique effectively complements the existing dynamic technique.
• We have proposed context-sensitive emulation, an effective approach that combines slicing and emulation for the precise and scalable analysis of runtime values of program variables.
• We have implemented our technique and evaluated its effectiveness by detecting unsafe loadings in nine popular Windows applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our technique with a running example. Section 3 presents a detailed description of our static detection algorithm. We describe our implementation and evaluation in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 surveys additional related work, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of future work.
OVERVIEW
This section illustrates our technique with the example shown in Figure 1 . Our technique works on binaries, but for presentational 15 . Two slices are generated for f1 and f2. We produce two context-sensitive interprocedural slices by instantiating twice the slice for __delay-LoadHelper2 and linking each instance with its respective caller's slice. We also maintain the mapping between each of the new slicing criteria and the callee's corresponding parameters for the later emulation phase. Because neither f1 nor f2 takes any input, we terminate the slicing computation. Figure 2 displays the two computed context-sensitive backward slices w.r.t. target_dllname.
Emulation of Context-sensitive Slices. To compute possible values for target_dllname, we emulate the two slices in Figure 2 . We need to schedule the instructions in the slices before they can be emulated. We do so respecting the data and control flow dependencies among the instructions. Specifically, we first schedule the basic blocks in topological order with respect to the data flow dependencies among them. We then determine the ordering of the instructions in each scheduled basic block in terms of their control flow dependencies captured in the original code. More concretely, if i1 precedes i2 in the original code, we emulate i1 before i2. For example, the instructions in the first slice in Figure 2 are scheduled as follows: 1) two basic blocks, B1 and B2, contain the instructions of the slice: B1 for line 3 in f1 and B2 for lines 22 and 23 in __delayLoadHelper2; 2) B2 depends on B1 because pImgDelayDesc used by B2 on line 22 is initialized on line 3 in B1, leading to the following scheduling: B1→B2; 3) we schedule the instructions of each basic block in terms of their control flow dependencies: lines 3, 22, and 23. For parameter passing, we initialize the formal parameter with the corresponding actual parameter's value. In our example, the value of the formal parameter pImgDelayDesc of __delayLoadHelper2 is provided by f1 through the value of pDelayDesc1.
After successfully emulating B1 and B2 for the first slice, we obtain the possible values of target_dllname: "WINSPOOL.DRV". Similarly, we obtain the other possible value for target_dllname after emulating the second slice: "COMDLG32.DLL".
Checking Phase. In our example, the two components, "WIN-SPOOL.DRV" and "COMDLG32.DLL", are potentially loaded at runtime. When the OS loads these components, it iterates through a sequence of directories, determined at runtime, to locate the specified files. In this case, these loadings are unsafe, if the OS checks multiple directories to resolve these components. This is because these loadings can be hijacked by placing an arbitrary file named WINSPOOL.DRV or COMDLG32.DLL in the directories checked before the intended resolution. We check whether or not the specified files exist in the first directory searched. Because Microsoft Windows searches first in the directory where the program is installed [7] , the loadings for these two components are unsafe if they do not exist in the program directory.
STATIC DETECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we present background information on unsafe component loadings and details of our analysis.
Background
Dynamic component loading is commonly supported by operating systems through specific system calls that take as input a full path or file name for the intended component. For example, Microsoft Windows provides component-loading system calls such as LoadLibraryA. Once such a system call is invoked, the OS resolves the target component as follows:
• The target component can be specified by its full path or its file name.
• When full path is used, the OS directly resolves the target using the provided full path.
• Otherwise, if file name is used and known by the OS, the full path of the specified file is predefined. For example, KER-NEL32.DLL is known by Microsoft Windows and its full path is predefined as "C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\KERNEL32.DLL".
• If the given file name is unknown to the OS, it iterates through the predefined search directories to locate the first file with the specified file name.
To formalize the component resolution process, it is necessary to model the file system state, because even the same componentloading code may result in different resolutions under different file system states (cf. Section 2). We formally define a file system state σ to be the set of the full paths of all files stored on the current file system. system state σ, and returns a resolved full path π ∈ Σ * , where Σ denotes the alphabet used to specify files and directories.
If f is a full path,
where is the empty string. If f is a file name,
where "+" denotes string concatenation.
We next formalize component loading, for which we need to consider the currently loaded components. The reason is that the OS does not load the same component multiple times. In our formalization, we let the set of loaded components L be the set of full paths of all the currently loaded components.
DEFINITION 3.2 (COMPONENT LOADING).
Given the loaded components L, a component loading function λ takes a component specification f ∈ Σ * , a directory search order d = d1, . . . , dn ∈ Σ * × . . . Σ * , a file system state σ, and the set of loaded components L, and returns a resolution success or failure:
The formalized component loading mechanism in Definition 3.2 is commonly used on major operating systems. Although a full path solely determines the target component, for a file name, the full path of the loading component often depends on the current file system state. This mechanism can lead to two types of unsafe loadings: resolution failure and resolution hijacking.
DEFINITION 3.3 (RESOLUTION FAILURE).
A resolution failure occurs if γ(f, d, σ) = . In this case, with a full path specification f , an arbitrary file with the same full path f can hijack the component loading. If f is file name, one can hijack this loading by placing a file with the specified name f in any directory di specified by the search order d = d1, . . . , dn . 
In this case, one can hijack the loading by placing a file with the specified name f in any directory di where i < k. To avoid unsafe loadings, it is necessary for developers to specify the target component in a safe manner. We define safe target component specifications as follows.
DEFINITION 3.5 (SAFE COMPONENT SPECIFICATION).
A loading specification is safe if either of the following holds:
Detailed Analysis
We now present the details of our analysis. Our technique statically detects unsafe component loadings to achieve high coverage. It first extracts the target component specifications from possible code region executed at runtime and check their safety based on Definition 3.5.
The executed code region is determined by loaded components. Figure 3 depicts the component loading code whose execution path controlled by a random variable x. If x is zero, foo1 of component A and foo2 of component C are executed. Otherwise, bar1 of component B and bar2 of component D are executed. Our observation is that each execution path covers the partial code region of the loaded components. For example, if x is zero, the partial code regions of components Program, A, and C are executed. From these observations, we design our static detection as shown in Figure 4 : extraction and checking. From the extraction phase, we obtain a set of the target component specifications from the components that can be loaded at runtime. In the checking phase, we evaluate the safety of each target specification based on Definition 3.5.
Extraction Phase
A component can load other components at loadtime or runtime. This loading introduces loadtime and runtime dependencies among components [24] . Based on these dependencies, we determine components that can be loaded during program execution. Specifically, we recursively resolve the components from the program file based on their loadtime and runtime dependencies. To resolve the dependent components, the corresponding target specifications, i.e., full path or file name, are needed. For loadtime dependencies, compilers specify the dependent components in the executable format. For example, the names of the loadtime dependent components are stored in IMAGE_IMPORT_DIRECTORY with the PE format [15] . To obtain the specifications of the runtime dependent components, we compute values of parameters to component-loading system calls. This suffices for our setting because program dynamically loads components via the system calls and their parameters determine the loaded components. As an example of recursive resolution, we search the components that can be loaded by Program in Figure 3 . Suppose that components E and F, which have no loadtime and runtime dependent component, implement the rand and LoadLibrary functions, respectively. In this case, Program loads components E and F on its startup. Regarding runtime dependencies, Program dynamically loads components with the specifications, "A" on line 4 and "B" on line 8 . From this information, we can detect the potentially-loaded components by simulating component resolution. Similarly, we can infer that C, D and F, which are loaded by A and B. Because C and D have no loadtime and runtime dependent components, we stop the resolution process. Thus, we detect the seven components potentially loaded at runtime: Program, A, B, C, D, E, and F.
The key step of the extraction phase is to obtain the target specification for component loading in a binary. The specification of a loadtime dependent component can be easily obtained from the binary file format. However, extracting the specification of a runtime dependent component is nontrivial because it often requires to locate the code relevant to the value of the specification and analyze its execution. For example, the target component specification for system libraries under Microsoft Windows is sometimes determined by concatenating the system directory path and the file name. To obtain the specification, it is necessary to extract the related code and analyze its execution result.
The concrete value of the parameter to the component-loading system call serves as the specification for the runtime dependent component. From this observation, we extract the specification by searching for the program variable for the specification and then computing its value via context-sensitive emulation, a novel combination of backward slicing and emulation. We describe details of the extraction in the following sections.
Searching Program Variable for Specification
In binary code, invoking the component-loading system calls often follows the stdcall calling convention 1 . When parameters are passed to the call site, they are pushed from right to left. For example, Figure 5 (a) represents the binary code corresponding to LoadLibraryExA(0x7D61AC5C, EAX, EAX). Based on the parameter passing mechanism, we locate the program variable, e.g., a register or a memory chunk, which stores the target specification. In particular, we detect the call site for component loading via static taint data analysis and then extract the input operands of the instructions passing the parameter to the call site. We describe details of each step in the rest of this section.
Locating Component-loading Call Sites. In this phase, we aim at finding the call site for component loading in a binary. Our observation is that software stores the address of the system call implementation in its memory space and utilizes it in the call sites for component loading at runtime. Figure 5 shows the two types of component-loading call sites in a binary, which are memory indirect and register indirect. The main difference between them is what type of the program variable stores the address of the componentloading system call at the call site. While the memory indirect type stores the address in a memory chunk, the register indirect type stores the address in a register, e.g., line 4 in Figure 5 (a) and line 3 in Figure 5(b) .
Based on this observation, we locate the component-loading call sites through static taint data analysis. In particular, we define the taint sources and the taint sinks as follows:
• Taint source: an instruction that references a memory chunk that stores the address of the component-loading system call.
• Taint sink: a branch instruction, e.g., call, whose target address is tainted. We consider the taint sink instructions as the call sites.
We now present examples on how to detect call sites. In Figure 5(a) , line 4 serves as not only the taint source but also the taint sink, i.e., the component-loading call site, because it is the branch instruction, accessing a memory chunk that stores the address of LoadLibraryExA. For Figure 5 (b), line 1 is the taint source, accessing the address of the LoadLibraryA, and line 3 is the taint sink, because it is the call instruction whose target is the address, stored in EBX.
Extracting Parameter Variables. Once a call site is located, we extract the program variables for the target specification from the predefined number of the instructions to pass the parameters to the call site. In particular, we detect the instructions, e.g., PUSH, to initialize the top of stack backward from the call site. Because the number of parameters of a component-loading system call is known, we can precisely extract all the variables to define this target specification. For example, the call site in Figure 5 (a) invokes LoadLibraryExA, and it has three parameters, i.e., 0x7D61AC5C, EAX, and EAX, via the instructions on lines 1-3.
Context-sensitive Emulation
In this phase, we compute the concrete values of the parameter variables extracted in Section 3.2.2. The computation may seem trivial at first. For example, the memory chunk at 0x7D61AC5C in Figure 5 (a) contains the target specification, "xpsp2res.dll". However, the computation is in fact challenging because it is necessary to extract the code to compute the variable, requiring interprocedural data flow analyses (cf. Figure 1) . Also, we need the runtime information of the code to obtain the concrete values of the variable. Symbolic analysis can serve as a potential solution. However, as we mentioned in Section 1, symbolic analysis suffers from poor scalability and is limited in handling system calls, which are often complex.
To address this problem, we introduce context-sensitive emulation, which novely combines backward slicing and emulation. Based on this combination, we can scalably and precisely compute the values of the variables of interest. We describe its details in the rest of this section. Backward Slicing. This phase performs the interprocedural backward slicing w.r.t. the parameter variable, extracting the instructions to compute the variable. This problem has been extensively studied, and many slicing algorithms [1, 5, 9, 16, 20, 21] have been proposed. These algorithms commonly solve the graph reachability problem over a System Dependence Graph (SDG) [9] , a set of Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs) [8] and edges capturing data flow dependencies among them. In particular, a SDG is constructed beforehand based on an exhaustive data flow analysis over the subject program. Then, the slicing outcome is determined by traversing the SDG from the given slicing criteria. Although the approach has been widely used, it is not appropriate for our problem setting. The reason is that binary files are generally composed of a large number of instructions, and an exhaustive data flow analysis over all the instructions is very expensive, leading to limited scalability. Our key observation is that the parameter values are often locally determined, that is the execution paths to compute the variables are relatively short. Thus, exhaustive data flow analysis is not be necessary to extract backward slices w.r.t. the given slicing criteria. Figure 6 shows the examples of the unnecessary data flow analysis during intraprocedural and interprocedural backward slicing.
Figure 6(a) shows an example of the CFG for constructing the PDG. Suppose that we perform intraprocedural backward slicing w.r.t. the instruction D. In this case, the bold instructions often only affect the instruction D in terms of control flow. It is possible that the instruction D can be affected by the instructions without control flow dependencies. For example, the instruction E initializes a variable and the instruction B reads it. However, this case rarely happens in our problem setting in practice, because the parameters for the specification are generally computed by the instructions executed before the component-loading call sites.
Suppose that Figure 6 (b) depicts the SDG for the interprocedural backward slicing. If the instructions of the bold PDGs for bar1 and bar2 are only traversed during slicing, is it not necessary to perform data flow analysis on the instructions of the grayed PDGs. Because the SDG consists of a large number of PDGs in binary and the target specifications are often locally determined, most of the PDGs are not relevant for interprocedural backward slicing w.r.t. the parameter variables for the target specifications.
Based on this insight, we design our slicing technique as demanddriven, reducing the unnecessary analysis of data flow dependencies. In particular, we perform interprocedural backward slicing by incrementally combining the intraprocedural backward slices whose slicing criteria are determined when necessary. Intraprocedural backward Slicing. For each intraprocedural backward slicing, we analyze only the data flow dependencies among the instructions that are control dependent on the given slicing criteria. To this end, we construct the PDG based on the predecessor subgraph w.r.t. the slicing criterion under the CFG. Thus, we can avoid the analysis of the data flow dependency among the instructions not traversed during slicing. Suppose that we perform intraprocedural backward slicing w.r.t. the instruction D in the CFG shown in Figure 6(a) . If we construct the PDG based on the CFG, the data flow dependencies among all the instructions in the CFG are analyzed. However, the grayed instructions do not affect the instruction D in terms of control flow dependencies. By constructing the PDG based on the subgraph composed of the bold instructions, i.e., the predecessor subgraph w.r.t. the instruction D, we can avoid some unnecessary data flow analysis when performing slicing. One challenge for PDG construction is caused by the call site instructions. Because functions are not generally monolithic, it is necessary to identify which call sites affect the slicing criteria. Although traversing the SDG provides such information, it requires the computation of significant amount of unnecessary data-flow dependencies (cf. Figure 6(b) ). To address this problem, we utilize the prototypes of the functions invoked at the call sites. Specifically, we consider a call site instruction as a non-branching instruction during our PDG construction, and analyze the data flow dependencies related to the call site in terms of the prototype of the callee function. For example, a call site invokes a function foo whose prototype is int foo(in,inout). In this case, the foo is considered an instruction that uses the first/second parameters and defines the second parameter and the return variable. Based on this information, we can effectively determine the data flow dependencies between the call site instructions and the slicing criteria without a whole SDG traversal. Interprocedural backward Slicing. As aforementioned, an exhaustive SDG construction often leads to significant amount of the unnecessary data flow analysis for interprocedural backward slicing. To address this problem, we construct the interprocedural backward slices incrementally combining the intraprocedural backward slices whose slicing criteria are chosen in a demand-driven manner.
There are two key challenges for this demand-driven combination. First, it is necessary to determine the new slicing criteria if the interprocedural backward slice consists of multiple intraprocedural backward slices. For example, we construct the interprocedural backward slice in Figure 6 (b) by combining the two intra-backward slices extracted from functions bar1 and bar2. In this case, we need to determine the new slicing criteria in the bar1 function. Second, the composed interprocedural backward slice needs to be easily handled for the later emulation phase.
Our basic idea for building the new slicing criteria is that the interprocedural data flow dependencies are captured by parameter passing. In SDG-based slicing, the PDGs are connected using the edges that model parameter passing, which are traversed to analyze the dependencies. Based on this idea, we choose the slicing criteria as follows. Suppose that an intraprocedural backward slice s is extracted from an instruction whose input operand is initialized through parameter p of the function f . In this case, we determine the new slicing criterion as the parameter variable corresponding to the parameter p. To locate this parameter variable, we use caller-callee relationship and the callee's function prototype. In particular, we detect the call site for function f and analyze f 's function prototype to obtain the index of the parameter corresponding to p. For example, the intraprocedural backward slice w.r.t. the target_dllname in Figure 1 uses the first parameter, i.e., pImgDelayDesc, of __de-layLoadHelper2. As two call sites on lines 5-7 and lines 14-16 invoke __delayLoadHelper2, we choose their first parameter variables, i.e., pDelayDesc1 on line 6 and pDelayDesc2 on line 15, as the new slicing criterion.
Once the new slicing criterion is determined, we construct the interprocedural backward slice by composing the intraprocedural backward slices and use the composed slice in the emulation phase. One simple method for composing the intraprocedural slices is to collect the instructions of each intraprocedural backward slice. For example, the interprocedural backward slice w.r.t. the target_dllname in Figure 1 consists of the instructions of three intraprocedural backward slices w.r.t. the slicing criteria, i.e., target_dllname, pDelayDesc1, and pDelayDesc2. However, this simple method produces context-insensitive slices, making the emulation phase complex. In particular, when emulating each instruction of the context-insensitive slice, we have to assume that the values of its operands are determined under all of its calling contexts.
To better support emulation, we combine the intraprocedural backward slices to construct a set of context-sensitive interprocedural backward slices. In particular, for a given intraprocedural backward slice s, if multiple new slicing criteria, p1 . . . pn, are determined, the set of the context-sensitive slices are constructed as {si∪s|si = ∪p i intraprocedural backward slice w.r.t. pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Thus, we can more straightforwardly use the contextsensitive slices to compute possible concrete values of the target component specification. For example, we can compute the possible values of target_dllname by emulating these slices in Figure 2 . We describe more details of our backward slicing phase in Algorithm 1. Function Prototype Analysis. The backward slicing phase relies on function prototypes, but such information is often unavailable in binary code. Our solution to this problem is as follows. For a given function f , its parameters are stored in fixed locations during f 's execution. Thus, we infer its prototype by analyzing how the instructions of the function access the memory chunks for the parameters, i.e., read or write. Figure 7 shows an example of our proposed prototype analysis for the foo function. Suppose that Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show part of foo and the stack layout at the beginning of the function's execution, respectively. In this case, the idx-th parameter is stored at the address ebp+4×(idx+1) where the stack is aligned by four bytes. From this observation, we can infer foo's prototype. It reads data from the memory chunks for its second and third parameters, and initializes the memory chunks for its first and fourth parameters, i.e., its function prototype is "eax foo(inout,in,in,inout)". Here we assume that its result is returned through the eax register.
To improve the precision of our prototype inference, we use the following effective heuristic. If the effective address of the memory chunk, obtained by the lea instruction, is passed to the function, we consider it as the inout parameter. The effective address corresponds to a pointer variable and the memory chunk that it points to is often initialized during function execution. Although this heuristics may increase the size of the computed slice, it is sufficient to compute possible values of the slicing criteria via emulation. Emulation Phase. In this phase, we compute the possible values of the target component specification by emulating its corresponding context-sensitive slices. There are two challenges for slice emulation. The first challenge is how to schedule the instructions because we do not know their runtime execution sequence. If the instructions are incorrectly scheduled, they may violate the data and control flow dependencies among them, which may lead to imprecise results or emulation failures. The second challenge is how to pass function parameters. Although parameter passing captures useful data flow dependencies, the context-sensitive slices do not explicitly specify the dependencies.
The idea behind our scheduling algorithm is that the data flow dependency graph for the basic blocks of a context-sensitive slice is often a directed acyclic graph (dag). Based on this observation, we schedule the basic blocks in their topological order over the data flow dependency graph. We then determine the sequence of the instructions of each basic block in terms of the control flow dependencies among them. For example, Figure 8 shows the data flow dependencies among the basic blocks of the first slice in Figure 2 . In this case, we schedule the basic blocks as B1, B2, and B3. For each basic block, the sequence of its instructions is determined as follows: i1, i4,i2,i3,i5,i6, and i7. The scheduled sequence of the instructions does not violate the data and control flow dependencies among them.
To handle parameter passing, we initialize the stack frame before emulating the callee function. In particular, suppose that a parameter p is passed to a function f . In this case, before emulating f 's basic blocks, we reserve the stack frame and initialize its memory chunk for the parameter with the concrete value of p. The location of the memory chunk is determined by the index of the passed parameter. For example, the address of the memory chunk for the idx-th parameter can be computed by ebp + 4 × (idx + 1), (cf. Figure 7) .
For example, we handle the parameter passing from f1 to __de-layLoadHelper2 in Figure 8 . When B1 is emulated, the offset WINSPOOL_DRV_DelayDesc is stored on top of the call stack for f1. Assuming that the initial value of esp for emulating B2 is equal to 0x13f258, the stored value initializes a memory chunk at arg_0=0x13f258+4×2, because it corresponds to the first parameter to __delayLoadHelper2. The instructions use arg_0 to reference the first parameter (e.g., i2).
Based on the techniques mentioned above, we emulate the contextsensitive slices to compute the possible values of the target component specification. For example, we can compute the value, "WIN-SPOOL.DRV", of the target_dllname by emulating the backward slice in Figure 8. 
Checking Phase
In this phase, we evaluate the safety of the target component specifications obtained from the extraction phase. To this end, for each specification, we check whether or not the safety conditions in Definition 3.5 are satisfied. Specifically, we consider that a specification can lead to unsafe loading if the OS cannot resolve the target component in the directory that is first searched. Note that the first directory searched by the OS for the resolution is known [6, 7] .
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our static technique in terms of precision, scalability, and code coverage. We show that our technique scales to large real-world applications and is precise. It also has good coverage, substantially better than the existing dynamic approach [12] .
Implementation
We implemented our technique as a plugin to IDA Pro 2 , a stateof-the-art commercial binary disassembler. Our implementation is composed of 4,347 LOC of IDAPython 3 and uses three libraries:
2 http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/ 3 http://code.google.com/p/idapython/ 1) NetworkX 4 for graph analysis, 2) PyEmu 5 for emulation, and 3) pefile 6 for PE format analysis. For the precise analysis of binaries, it is important to map between C-like variables and memory regions accessed by instructions. We adapt the concept of a abstract location (a-loc) [2] , which models a concrete memory address in terms of the base address for a memory region and a relative offset. For example, the a-loc for &a [4] is mem_4 where mem is the base address of the array a and 4 is the relative offset from the base address. Refer to Balakrishnan and Reps [2] for more details.
Evaluation Setup and Results
We aim at detecting unsafe component loadings in applications. Because the detection of unsafe loadings from the system libraries is performed by the operating system, we only resolve the application components in the extraction phase. Table 1 shows our analysis results on nine popular Windows applications. We chose these applications as our test subjects because they are important applications in wide-spread use. The results show that our technique can effectively detect, from program binaries, unsafe component loadings potentially loaded at runtime. One interesting finding to note is that the results of the extraction phase for Seamonkey and Thunderbird are identical. This is likely because both applications are part of the Mozilla project and use the same set of program components.
Precision and Scalability
We rely on IDA Pro for disassembling binaries, and Table 1 includes the time that it took IDA Pro to disassemble the nine applications. This time dominates our analysis time as we show later. These are large applications, and also we only need to disassemble the code once for all the subsequent analysis.
According to our analysis of context-sensitive emulation, the number of slices is generally larger than that of the call sites. This indicates that parameters for loading library calls can have multiple values, confirming the need for context-sensitive slices. The average number of instructions for the slices is quite small, which empirically validates our analysis design decisions.
We now discuss the evaluation of our tool's scalability. To this end, we measure its analysis time and the efficiency of its backward slicing phase. Table 2 shows the detailed results, including detection time and relative cost of slice construction. The results show that our analysis is practical and can analyze all nine large applications within minutes. To further understand its efficiency, we compared our backward slicing with standard SDG-based slicing. In particular, we analyzed the size of the constructed PDGs for backward slicing. For a standard SDG-based approach, one has to [12] .
construct the complete SDG before performing slicing. We thus measured how many functions and instructions there are in each application as these numbers indicate the cost of this a priori construction (cf. the two columns labeled "Static total"). As the table shows, we achieve orders of magnitude reduction in terms of both the number of functions and the number of instructions analyzed.
Code Coverage
To evaluate our tool's code coverage, we compare unsafe loadings detected by the static and dynamic analyses. In particular, we detected unsafe component loadings with the existing dynamic technique [12] and compared its results with our static detection. In this evaluation, we focus on application-level runtime unsafe loadings as loadtime dependent components are loaded by OS-level code. Table 3 shows results of this comparison. We see that our static analysis can detect not only most of the dynamically-detected unsafe loadings but also many other potential ones as well. We next give a closer examination of the results.
Static-only Cases. Our static analysis detects many additional potential unsafe loadings. It is important to understand whether they indicate real errors or not. We manually studied these additional detected unsafe loadings to evaluate the precision of our analysis. In particular, we analyzed whether they are reachable from the entry points of the programs, i.e., whether there exist paths from the entry points to the call sites of the unsafe loadings in the programs' interprocedural CFGss (ICFGs). In this analysis, we consider the main function of an application and the UI callback functions as the entry points of the application's ICFG. Table 3 shows our results on this reachability analysis. Note that those loadings marked as "Unknown" may still be reachable as it is difficult to resolve indirect jumps in binary code, so certain control flow edges may be missing from the ICFGs.
All the statically reachable unsafe loadings lead to componentload hijacking if the corresponding call sites are invoked and the target components have not been loaded yet. As a concrete example, Foxit Reader 3.0 has a call site for loading MAPI32.DLL, which is invoked when the current PDF file is attached to an email message. This loading can be hijacked by placing a file with the same name MAPI32.DLL into the directory where Foxit Reader 3.0 is installed. Dynamic-only Cases. According to Table 3 , our technique misses a few of the dynamically detected unsafe loadings. We manually examined all these cases, and there are two reasons for this: system hook dependency and failed emulation, which we elaborate next.
First, Microsoft Windows provides a mechanism to hook particular events (e.g., mouse events). If hooking is used, a component can be loaded into the process to handle the hooked event. This component injection introduces a system hook dependency [24] . Such a loading may be unsafe, but since it is performed by the OS at runtime and is not an application error, we do not detect it.
Second, our extraction phase may miss some target component specifications due to failed emulations. If this happens, we may miss some unsafe component loadings even if their corresponding call sites are found. Emulation failures can be caused by the following reasons.
External Parameters. A target specification may be defined by a parameter of an exported function, which is not invoked. For example, suppose that a function foo exported by a component A loads a DLL specified by foo's parameter. If foo is not invoked by A, the parameter's concrete value will be unknown. One may mitigate this issue by analyzing the data flow dependencies among the dependent components. However, such an analysis does not guarantee to obtain all the target specifications, because the exported functions are often not invoked by the dependent components.
Uninitialized Memory Variables. The slices may have instructions referencing memory variables initialized at runtime. In this case, our slice emulation may be imprecise or fail. To address this problem, it is necessary to extract the sequence of instructions from the dependent components that initialize these memory variables and emulate the instructions before slice emulation. Although it is possible to analyze memory values, such as the Value Set Analysis (VSA) [18] , it is difficult to scale such analysis to large applications.
Unknown Semantics of System Calls. Detailed semantics of system calls is often undocumented, and sometimes even their names are not revealed. When we encounter such system calls, we cannot analyze nor emulate them. When information of such system calls becomes available, we can easily add analysis support for them.
Disassemble Errors. Our implementation relies on IDA Pro to disassemble binaries, and sometimes the disassemble results are incorrect. For example, IDA Pro sometimes is not able to disassemble instructions passing parameters to call sites for delayed loading. Such errors can lead to imprecise slices and emulation failures.
RELATED WORK
We survey additional related work besides the one on dynamic detection of unsafe loadings [12] , which we have already discussed.
Our technique performs static analysis of binaries. Compared to the analysis of source code, much less work exists [1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22] . In this setting, Value Set Analysis (VSA) [2, 18] is perhaps the most closely related to ours. It combines numeric and pointer analyses to compute an over-approximation of numerical values of program variables. Compared to VSA, our technique focuses on the computation of string variables. It is also demanddriven and uses context-sensitive emulation to scale to real-world large applications.
As we discussed earlier, instead of emulation, symbolic analysis [11] could be used to compute concrete values of the program variables. However, symbolic techniques generally suffer from poor scalability, and more importantly, it is not practical to symbolically reason about system calls, which are often very complex. Our novel use of context-sensitive emulation provides a practical solution for computing the values of program variables.
Starting with Weiser's seminal work [25] , program slicing has been extensively studied [23, 26] . Our work is related to the large body of work on static slicing, in particular the SDG-based techniques. Standard SDG-based static slicing techniques [1, 5, 9, 16, 20, 21] build the complete SDGs beforehand. In contrast, we build control-and data-flow dependence information in a demand-driven manner, starting from the given slicing criteria. Our slicing technique is also modular because we model each call site using its callee's inferred summary that abstracts away the internal dependencies of the callee. In particular, we treat a call as a non-branching instruction and approximate its dependencies with the callee's summary information. This optimization allows us to abstract away detailed data flow dependencies of a function using its corresponding call instruction. We make an effective trade-off between precision and scalability. As shown by our evaluation results, function prototype information can be efficiently computed and yield precise results for our setting.
Our slicing algorithm is demand-driven, and is thus also related to demand-driven dataflow analyses [10, 17] , which have been proposed to improve analysis performance when complete dataflow facts are not needed. These approaches are similar to ours in that they also leverage caller-callee relationship to rule out infeasible dataflow paths. The main difference is that we use a simple prototype analysis to construct concise function summaries instead of directly traversing the functions' intraprocedural dependence graphs, i.e., their PDGs. Another difference is that we generate context-sensitive executable program slices for emulation to avoid the difficulty in reasoning about system calls.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a practical static binary analysis to detect unsafe loadings. The core of our analysis is a technique to precisely and scalably extract which components are loaded at a particular loading call site. We have introduced context-sensitive emulation, which combines incremental and modular slice construction with the emulation of context-sensitive slices. Our evaluation on nine popular Windows application demonstrates the effectiveness of our technique. Because of its good scalability, precision, and coverage, our technique serves as an effective complement to dynamic detection [12] . For future work, we would like to consider two interesting directions. First, because unsafe loading is a general concern and also relevant for other operating systems, we plan to extend our technique and analyze unsafe component loadings on Unix-like systems. Second, we plan to investigate how our technique can be improved to reduce emulation failures.
